Supply network delegation and intervention strategies during supplier involvement in new product development by Johnsen, Thomas
Supply network delegation and intervention strategies
during supplier involvement in new product development
Thomas Johnsen
To cite this version:
Thomas Johnsen. Supply network delegation and intervention strategies during supplier in-
volvement in new product development. International Journal of Operations and Produc-
tion Management, Emerald, 2011, 31 (6), pp.686-708. <10.1108/01443571111131999>. <hal-
00771835>
HAL Id: hal-00771835
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00771835
Submitted on 4 Sep 2013
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
  1 
 
 
SUPPLY NETWORK DELEGATION AND INTERVENTION STRATEGIES DURING 
SUPPLIER INVOLVEMENT IN NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 
Dr Thomas E. Johnsen  
Associate Professor in Purchasing & Supply Management 
Centre of Purchasing & Supply Chain Atlantique (PASCA) 
Audencia Nantes School of Management, 
8 Route de la Joneliere, 
BP 31222 – 44312 Nantes Cedex 3, France.  
E-mail: tjohnsen@audencia.com  
Tel: + 33 (0)240 37 46 25 
Fax: +33 (0)2 40 37 34 07 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose - This paper proposes and empirically investigates two strategies that companies can 
employ to involve indirect suppliers in new product development: supply network delegation 
and supply network intervention. The implications of the two strategies are explored. 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper brings together the traditional new product 
development literature, organizational behaviour and organizational economics literature, and 
reports on three in-depth case studies of new product development projects, involving 39 
semi-structured interviews across three supply networks.  
Findings – Findings reveal different manifestations of the two strategies of supply network 
intervention and delegation, when applied as part of supplier involvement in product 
development, and positive and negative indications of delegation and intervention, depending 
on the actor perspective: manufacturers perceive a need to control the product development 
process across several supply network tiers through intervention in supplier selection and 
communication, but these actions are likely to „tie the hands of the suppliers‟. 
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Practical implications - Managers are advised to explicitly delegate decisions to suppliers, 
for example, by issuing parts approval lists and encouraging communication and problem 
solving amongst suppliers, and to exercise caution in applying the intervention strategy. 
Originality/value - The paper contributes to a better understanding of how to involve 
indirect (sub-) suppliers in product development, and the implications of these actions for 
multiple supply network actors. 
Keywords: Supply networks, supplier involvement, delegation, intervention, product 
development 
Paper type: Research paper 
 
 
1. Introduction 
                                                                                                            
Suppliers are important to consider as partners in new product development (NPD) projects, 
because they provide access to specialized design and development capabilities. Indeed, a 
substantial body of literature on supplier involvement in NPD has evolved over the last 25 
years or so (Imai et al., 1985; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Wasti and Liker, 1997; Petersen et 
al., 2005), suggesting that early and extensive involvement of key suppliers in NPD projects 
is critical for NPD success.  
 
However, there are many management challenges associated with achieving performance 
benefits from supplier involvement (Hartley et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995; 
Karlsson et al., 1998; Van Echtelt et al., 2008). One of these challenges is for companies to 
look beyond their immediate first tier suppliers and consider how they can exploit their wider 
supply network (Staudenmayer et al., 2005). This is pertinent in increasingly dynamic and 
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complex industries, which necessitate that a range of complementary technologies and 
capabilities are incorporated into innovative product/service offerings. Yet there is a paucity 
of research that has examined the strategies that companies can employ to access the indirect 
suppliers that reside in their wider supply network, for example in terms of how they delegate 
NPD responsibilities and in which ways they seek to intervene in NPD decisions within 
supply networks. This is important both because the performance of direct suppliers depends 
on lower tier suppliers and because sources of innovation often stem from distant 
relationships within the wider network (Håkansson, 1987; Birkinshaw et al., 2007). 
Identifying the most appropriate ways of exploiting the wider supply network for improved 
NPD performance through delegation and/or intervention is therefore a theoretical and a 
practical research imperative. This paper seeks to contribute to existing research by exploring 
the manifestations and implications of supply network strategies when applied as part of 
supplier involvement in NPD. The research questions driving this study were:  
 
1. In what ways are supply network intervention and delegation strategies manifested 
during supplier involvement projects? 
2. What are the multi-actor implications of supply network intervention and delegation 
strategies for the processes of supplier selection and communication during supplier 
involvement projects? 
 
The paper builds on and brings together the traditional NPD literature and the literature on 
managerial intervention and delegation found in the organizational behaviour and 
organizational economics literature. Bringing together these two literatures furthers our 
understanding of involving supply networks, rather than merely direct suppliers, in NPD. In 
  4 
particular, this contributes to understanding the concepts of delegation and intervention 
strategies.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The following section reviews research into supplier 
involvement in NPD focusing on the role of supplier selection and communication. The third 
section defines the concepts of delegation and intervention and discusses how these can be 
applied in a supply network context. The fourth section outlines the methodology and the 
fifth section reports the findings from three in-depth case studies of supply network 
delegation and intervention during NPD projects. The sixth section discusses the findings on 
delegation and intervention strategies. Section seven discusses the different manifestations of 
delegation and intervention strategies and section eight outlines the conclusions. 
 
 
2. Supplier involvement in NPD 
 
There is a flourishing body of research that has developed and tested how companies can 
make the most of supplier involvement in NPD. Selecting the right suppliers has been 
identified as one key success factor. Suppliers should have strong complementary technical 
capabilities (Hartley et al., 1997; Petersen et al., 2005) and agree technical metrics and 
targets. Furthermore, Ragatz et al. (1997) identified the role of shared training, trust, risk and 
reward sharing, agreed performance measurements, top management commitment and 
supplier capability confidence. Likewise, Petersen et al. (2003) suggested that supplier 
representation on NPD development teams is critical. LaBahn and Krapfel (2000) further 
pointed out that the power dynamics within buyer-supplier relationships should not be 
underestimated and that powerful customers, who behave opportunistically, may ruin the 
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trust and commitment that have taken a long time to evolve (see also Cousins and Crone, 
2003). Development of trust and commitment is therefore a pre-condition for successful 
supplier involvement in NPD.  
 
Open and frequent knowledge sharing and communication is a recurring theme in the 
supplier involvement literature Littler et al. (1995) found that frequent inter-company 
communication increased the likelihood of success. Ragatz et al. (1997) further identified 
direct and cross-functional inter-company communication as the most widely used technique 
for supplier integration in NPD (see also Petersen et al., 2003; Wasti and Liker, 1997). 
Similarly, in Takeishi‟s (2001) study of Japanese automakers and suppliers, frequent face-to-
face communication and early integrated problem solving were found to positively affect 
design quality. Recently, Lawson et al. (2009) reported on a study of knowledge sharing in 
inter-organizational NPD teams; they found knowledge sharing to be positively associated 
with NPD performance, and that formal and informal socialization mechanisms facilitated 
knowledge sharing and the development of trust within buyer-supplier relationships.  
 
Various authors highlighted the need for a supplier involvement typology, segmenting the 
level of involvement according to, for example, the level of supplier responsibility and 
development risk (Wynstra and ten Pierick, 2000; Petersen et al., 2005). Similarly, Fliess and 
Becker (2006) emphasized how supplier integration, coordination and communication differ 
according to the type of supplier involvement i.e. contractual, coordinated or joint 
development, and the development stage. However, even using classifications most research 
on supplier involvement in NPD focuses on dyadic relationships between manufacturers and 
their direct suppliers. Yet there is a strong and long-established body of research, which 
emphasizes the need to understand the embeddedness of dyadic relationships in wider 
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industrial networks (e.g. Ford et al. 2003; Håkansson, 1987). This raises the question of how 
companies can involve not only their direct suppliers, but also those that exist within their 
wider supply networks.  
 
3. Supply network intervention and delegation strategies 
 
This study focuses on the role of supply network delegation and intervention as ways to 
involve indirect suppliers in NPD. Although the concepts of intervention and delegation are 
not new to the wider management literature, little research appears to have been conducted 
within the realms of NPD. Therefore, the next section briefly reviews research on 
intervention and delegation in the general management literature, particularly the fields of 
organizational behaviour and economics. Combined with the more traditional NPD literature, 
this body of literature is used to explore the role of supply network intervention and 
delegation strategies during supplier involvement in NPD.  
 
 
3.1. Managerial intervention and delegation 
 
Delegation is a widely used concept in management theory and can be broadly defined as „the 
process of entrusting authority and responsibility to others throughout the various levels of 
the organization, and the creation of a special manager-subordinate relationship‟ (Mullins, 
2005, p.1053). Intervention is a more difficult concept to pin down: it tends to imply 
interference in someone else‟s business and therefore often has a negative association, 
although managerial intervention can also be regarded more positively.  
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Discussing the implications of managerial intervention at firm-level, Foss et al. (2006, pp. 
798-799) argued that firms rely on both managerial authority and employee discretion; while 
some degree of authoritative action is required through intervention, „discretion may be 
rationally delegated to employees to the extent that it stimulates motivation and fosters local 
learning and the use of local knowledge‟. Similarly, authors in organizational economics have 
examined the concepts of authority and delegation (Williamson, 1970; Simon, 1951). 
Organizational economists usually view both delegation and intervention as beneficial, 
although it is recognized that there may also be negative outcomes associated with both. 
Various mechanisms including implicit contracts (Baker et al., 1999) and explicit credible 
commitments (Brockner et al., 1992) have been proposed as ways to reduce the incidence and 
severity of harmful managerial interventions.  
 
Organizational behaviourists tend to view delegation as a matter of „empowerment‟ (Conger 
and Kanungo, 1988; Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). Empowerment suggests that increasing 
the delegation and discretion to employees often „raises the perceived self-determination of 
employees and therewith strengthens intrinsic motivation‟ (Osterloh and Frey, 2000, p. 543), 
and may lead to increased creativity in pursuit of goals (Foss et al., 2006). In comparison 
with intervention, delegation therefore usually has a positive connotation, although it may 
also have a downside if employees do not appreciate or feel competent to command such 
discretion (Mowday et al., 1982).  
 
Williamson (1996, pp. 150-151) suggested that the option to intervene „can be exercised both 
for good cause (to support expected net gains) and for bad (to support the subgoals of the 
intervenor)‟.  It follows that although intervention may be perceived as a positive action, it 
often has negative associations, especially when the intervenor lacks credibility (Williamson, 
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1993). The notion of intervention for a bad cause implies managerial opportunism 
(Williamson, 1996), and suggests that there are costs as well as benefits to deploying 
managerial authority through intervention. Inspired by the ancient expression of „tying the 
king‟s hands‟ (Root, 1989), Foss et al. (2006) neatly characterized opportunistic managerial 
intervention as a way of „tying the manager‟s hands‟, and concurred with Williamson (1996) 
that it may result in sub-optimization and be damaging to overall value creation.  
 
Intervention and delegation therefore represent alternative ways of exerting managerial 
authority within firms. Delegation involves empowering employees to take decisions that 
relate to their own work. It has been linked to increased motivation and creativity in pursuit 
of goals, at least in those situations where employees feel competent to command such 
discretion. Intervention implies managerial action and may therefore constitute a positive 
rational behaviour, but several authors highlight the potentially negative implication of 
intervention associated with managerial opportunism that can ultimately lead to „tying the 
manager‟s hands‟.  
 
3.2. Supply network intervention and delegation  
The concept of supply chain management (SCM) implies that focal companies manage their 
entire supply chain from original sources of raw materials to end customers (Lambert and 
Cooper, 2000). Therefore, one might expect existing research to have investigated 
intervention and delegation issues in a supply chain context. Yet, the majority of research on 
intervention and delegation concerns firm-level decision-making and not supply chain or 
network management.  
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The increasing use of modular architectures in many industries has been described as a way 
to delegate design and development decisions to a small core of supply network partners 
(Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Baldwin and Clark, 1997). Standardized component interfaces 
in modular product systems create „nearly decomposable systems‟ (Simon, 1962) and thereby 
reduce „the need for overt exercise of managerial authority to achieve coordination of 
development processes‟ (Sanchez and Mahoney, ibid, p. 64). Modular product designs 
facilitate modular decomposed organizational designs in which decision-making is 
partitioned into tasks (von Hippel, 1990) that can be performed autonomously and 
concurrently by loosely coupled organizations (Sanchez and Mahoney, ibid). Enabling 
systems sourcing strategies, whereby entire systems, or modules, are sourced from large sub-
system integrators, modular product designs may result in - and require - tiered supply 
network structures. Furthermore, product modularization is often linked to a physically 
proximate and closely integrated supply chain although it may paradoxically add extra tiers 
(Lau and Yam, 2005). In summary, modularization may enable increased delegation of 
design and development decisions to supply networks once manufacturers have designed the 
overall product architecture and component interfaces and thereby reduce the need for 
manufacturer intervention (Ulrich, 1995).  
 
The concept of „disintermediation‟ involves the elimination of an intermediary in a supply 
chain and resembles interventionist SCM thinking. Most examples of disintermediation 
concern on-line companies (e.g. Amazon.com) that have cut out the middle-man, and thereby 
created a cost and/or time advantage. „Direct purchasing‟ also exemplifies supply chain 
intervention. Brown et al. (2005) identified direct purchasing as among the first 
manifestations of SCM involving analysis of the extended supply chain. It usually involves 
retailers buying directly from producers, and therefore exemplifies „cutting out the middle-
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man‟, in relation to upstream suppliers. Johnsen and Ford (2005, 2007) similarly used the 
concept of intervention to describe the situation where the customer becomes directly 
involved in its indirect supplier‟s activities (e.g. „second tier‟ suppliers), which is therefore 
effectively a method of disintermediation.  
 
Lamming (1996) argued that intervention is often a case of interference, practiced because 
the customer does not trust the supplier to implement operational improvements on its own. 
This negative perception is consistent with the commonly held views of organizational 
behaviourists regarding firm-level intervention. Hines (1996) perceived intervention more 
positively, suggesting that intervention may simply be applied in cases where the customer 
seeks to help out an ailing supplier by applying its management skills to its operational 
problems.  
 
In summary, the concepts of intervention and delegation are both well-described within 
organizational economics and parts of the organizational behaviour literature, which have 
analyzed the effects of both strategies, but predominantly at intra-firm level. SCM theory 
promises to adopt an end-to-end supply chain perspective, but although there are examples of 
supply chain studies going beyond a dyadic unit of analysis, little research has attempted to 
do so in the context of NPD. The focus of this paper is on the manifestations and implications 
of each strategy on the process of supplier involvement in NPD projects. It is particularly 
relevant to consider how delegation and intervention strategies affect the important processes 
of supplier selection and communication. For example, companies might attempt to influence 
supplier selection of their second or third tier suppliers. They might also communicate design 
ideas or concepts directly with second or third tier suppliers. But what are the implications of 
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such actions? The following section outlines the research methods employed to investigate 
the research questions. 
 
4. Research method 
 
4.1. Case study rationale and data collection process 
 
Unlike survey-based research, case studies that extend into several supply network tiers 
enable analysis of structural and processual inter-organizational factors from multiple 
respondent perspectives. Although supplier involvement is becoming well-understood by 
researchers in the field, the employment of supply network delegation and intervention 
strategies in this context is a relatively new area of study and naturally lends itself to multiple 
in-depth case study research (Yin, 1989; Meredith, 1998; Voss et al., 2002). For these 
reasons this study employed an in-depth case study research design, conducted from an 
interpretivist perspective (Ramsay, 1998), with focus on understanding the meaning of events 
and phenomena. The cases aimed to collect rich and qualitative data yet remaining rigorous 
by ensuring well-developed research protocols, instruments and pre-planned methods of 
analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
Prior to launching the in-depth case studies, a pilot study that involved five face-to-face 
interviews across five companies was conducted. These exploratory open-ended interviews 
helped to refine the research questions, grasp supply network strategies employed during 
supplier involvement projects, and thereby helped to ensure construct validity and reliability 
(Yin, 1989; Voss et al., 2002). Building on the lessons from the pilot study and a review of 
the literature, data collection for the in-depth case studies commenced. Three case studies 
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were selected from two industries: automotive and telecommunications; these industries were 
chosen because they have been identified in other studies as typical contexts in which 
supplier involvement is now established best practice. Two industries were included to avoid 
the study being industry-specific and to improve external validity (Yin, 1989). NPD projects 
constituted the unit of analysis, so each project constituted a case study. All projects had 
either been completed recently or were nearing the launch stage. 
 
Each project was accessed through a focal company, although interviews were conducted 
with several companies involved in the NPD projects in order to gain a variety of 
perspectives. In addition to three interviews conducted during case study facilitation, the 
three cases involved in total 34 semi-structured interviews with managers and directors at 
different levels and from a variety of functions within the focal firms and also with a 
selection a key suppliers and customers.  
 
The suppliers that were interviewed were identified as „high-involvement‟ suppliers by the 
focal firms, based on assessment of component value and risk. This „snowballing‟ process 
(Robson, 1997) continued as far as practically feasible in each case. The focal firm customers 
were also interviewed where appropriate. As the interviews concerned sensitive issues all 
interviewees were promised confidentiality so all names of individuals and real company 
names have been concealed in this paper.  
 
Each interview lasted approximately one and a half to three hours. Semi-structured interview 
protocols were used (Voss et al., 2002) where questions were open-ended rather than fully 
operationalized, so extensive discussion often took place around the formal questions (Yin, 
1989). Initial interviews in each case focused on contextual issues i.e. company, project, 
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customer and supplier characteristics. Supply network maps were drawn to identify the major 
actors involved in the project and the components or technologies they contributed; 
simplified version of these are shown in Figure 1. Subsequent interviews examined the 
process of customer-supplier collaboration within the projects and explored whether and how 
companies sought to intervene in and/or delegate decisions within the wider supply network. 
Appendix A contains an abbreviated generic version of the interview protocol. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
4.2. Analytical techniques 
 
The interviews were tape-recorded and subsequently transcribed. Transcripts were read and 
annotated providing a first level coding (Miles and Huberman, 1984). In addition, contextual 
factors and emerging themes raised by respondents were identified. Role-ordered matrices 
(Miles and Huberman, 1984) were constructed and used as coding frameworks to analyze 
focal actor, supplier and customer interpretations. Cross-case analysis provided external 
validation of the individual case study findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). Hence, patterns were 
identified across the cases by using cross-case comparison meta-matrices (Miles and 
Huberman, 1984). This process created an aggregated picture of intra- and inter-company 
interpretations and helped to ensure internal validity (Yin, 1989).  
 
A follow-up meeting was held with the main contact within each case to validate 
interpretation of findings, either face-to-face or by telephone. These meetings sought to 
validate interpretations and emerging conclusions (Eisenhardt, 1989) and further enquires 
were made about recent developments and areas of ambiguity.  
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INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
5. Contextual analysis  
Table 1 compares some important contextual characteristics across the three cases and Table 
2 provides a brief background description of each case. The focal companies were suppliers 
to assemblers, or first-tier suppliers. The projects in each case study shared several features 
but also differed in some respects, for instance, in relation to the extent of product modularity 
and innovation: the Asian car development project involved radical innovation in the form of 
the application of a material that had not previously been used in high volume car production. 
The other two cases concerned more incremental developments.  
 
Moreover, the Asian car development project concerned the development of a car (an end 
product), although the focal company was an engineering supplier, with a wide-spanning 
project management role. The fuel tank and the base station projects focused on the 
development of components and the wider end product perspective was accounted for by end 
customer interviews.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
6. Analysis of intervention and delegation in supplier selection and communication 
 
The inter-case analysis reports on patterns of responses across the three cases. The case study 
design enabled analysis of the intervention and delegation strategies employed by both focal 
companies and focal company customers. In fact, respondents often divulged how 
intervention and delegation were used by other companies within their supply network rather 
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than themselves. The in-depth case studies therefore illustrated multi-actor strategies within 
the supply networks.  
 
The findings suggested that companies generally felt a strong need to involve key 
„partnership‟ suppliers early and extensively in their NPD projects. However, there was much 
variation in the extent to which companies actively sought to involve sub-suppliers during the 
NPD process and the strategies they employed to seek wider supply network involvement. 
The following sub-sections report on the manifestations of intervention and delegation 
strategies identified in supplier selection and communication during the NPD projects.  
 
6.1. Supplier selection 
 
Intervention in supplier selection 
 
All three cases showed evidence of extensive intervention in the supplier selection process 
and it was usually manifested in either specification of sub-suppliers or specification of 
components that would strongly narrow the field of which sub-suppliers to use. In other 
words, whereas some companies found it necessary to name sub-suppliers they insisted their 
direct suppliers use, other companies merely ensured that sub-components complied with 
their particular specifications. For example, in the base station and the Asian car projects the 
focal companies both sought to exert their influence on sub-supplier selection through 
component specification i.e. by virtue of the design by producing very narrow part 
specifications:  
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There is a fairly strong logic that says the person who holds the pencil actually holds the 
supplier selection as well because the person who does the design work can actually dictate 
who can make that part. So we ensured that where we found it important to use a particular 
supplier or that supplier’s component, the best design was drawn up using that component…. 
So it was probably a little bit sneaky to do it that way but rather than impose our will upon 
them we took the view that the same result would be achieved by designing the vehicle 
around those standard parts…. We didn’t specify those indirect suppliers, we specified which 
components had to be used and because they had a very limited tooling and development 
budget they were hamstrung – they could not then justify going and copying that part at 
another supplier. AutoEngineer 
 
In the fuel tank project J-Car managed part of the indirect supplier selection or specification 
by using one supplier (S1) as a sourcing agent to Japanese suppliers. The presence of S1 
helped the fuel tank supplier to access remote suppliers, whilst also leveraging J-Car‟s power. 
A flipside of the intervention strategy in supplier selection was that it resulted in suppliers 
having their hands tied by their customer‟s intervention. This became apparent as interviews 
progressed upstream in the supply networks. For example, S2 admitted that they would have 
deliberately avoided one of these suppliers if they had had the choice: They are a pain in the 
neck supplier for me. But basically I have no choice because J-Car has nominated [them].  
 
The fuel tank case demonstrated most clearly the significant implications for suppliers of an 
interventionist strategy. EuroPart had to cope with extensive intervention by J-Car, who 
negotiated prices directly with EuroPart‟s two key suppliers. The relationships amongst 
EuroPart‟s main suppliers and its customer J-Car were thus characterized by a system of 
enforced cost transparency, which J-Car perceived as an advantage, but which constrained 
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EuroPart‟s ability to make what it perceived as a viable profit. Although as one of its 
respondent stated, if any problems occurred they could turn around and say ‘You nominated 
them’.  
 
A similar pattern was observed in the base station case where the focal company purchased 
materials directly with one of its sub-suppliers, leaving the supplier with little ability to 
determine cost and margin levels within its key supplier relationships. Moreover, in 
conjunction with its customer, the focal company sought to drive sub-suppliers targets to 
ensure the overall project cost, quality and delivery targets be achieved; these manifestations 
of intervention strategies were most prominent in the base station case. 
 
Most of the examples of intervention in sub-supplier selection stemmed from final product 
assemblers rather than the focal companies (suppliers). However, in both the base station 
project and the Asian car project the focal companies consulted their customers about their 
assessment of the companies‟ existing and potential suppliers. The focal companies‟ 
customers trusted their suppliers to manage the project on their behalf and did not feel the 
urge to dictate supplier selection, instead relying on debate and mutual compromise.  
 
 
Delegation in supplier selection 
 
Examples of explicit delegation of supplier selection decisions were limited. However when 
companies made little attempt to manage NPD projects beyond the direct supplier 
relationships, they tended to perceive this as effectively delegating their requirements to their 
supply network. Many companies stated that they barely had the resources to manage their 
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direct supplier relationships so any attempts to manage beyond these would be utopia. They 
relied on direct suppliers to manage the process on their behalf, yet they did not appear to 
have issued any explicit preferences or guidelines for suppliers. 
 
The only exemption was the base station case where TelePart issued parts approval lists with 
names of suppliers that had demonstrated credibility through past performance and where 
mutual understanding of needs and requirements had evolved; suppliers were expected to 
comply fully with the requirements set out on the parts approval list. One of the supplier 
interviews in the TelePart case showed the difficulty of diverting from the parts approval list: 
 
We’ve offered alternative manufacturers for the approval process. So far we have not 
succeeded in introducing [other suppliers]. [Our suppliers] are specified by TelePart – some 
components are specified through TM as in the electronic devices…. There’s been a lot of 
negotiation between TelePart and TM to get this [approved parts] list together. If there’s any 
deviation from that parts list then it would need to go back through the re-approval process, 
which costs thousands of pounds and time of the engineers. So once we’ve produced this 
product and it’s been approved by TelePart and TM with the range of components then that’s 
set in stone and we can’t deviate from that particular range of components. There’s a fixed 
number of alternative manufacturers that TelePart and TM would accept. 
 
Issuing parts approval lists exemplified explicit delegation of supplier selection 
responsibility. Apart from this practice, however, there was limited evidence of explicit 
delegation in the supplier selection process. Suppliers were either left to their own devices in 
their choice of sub-suppliers or delegation took the form of allowing suppliers flexibility to 
choose their own suppliers provided these complied with approved parts lists. Where 
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respondents stated that „we leave that to suppliers‟, it was effectively a delegation of 
decisions to direct suppliers, although the delegation was implicit and informal. In the base 
station case and, especially, the fuel tank case the extensive intervention in supplier selection 
seemed to preclude delegated decisions. 
 
 
6.2. Communication 
 
Intervention in communication 
 
Across the cases there were attempts to communicate and share knowledge directly with sub-
suppliers. This was most evident in the case of the fuel tank development project where J-Car 
communicated, for example, design changes, terms and conditions, and cost/margin 
information directly to a group of sub-suppliers. J-Car thereby chose to circumvent EuroPart 
in its communication with its own suppliers, because it viewed certain components as being 
so critical, from a commercial and safety point of view, that it needed to take charge of 
communication with sub-suppliers. Direct intervention was frequently described as a resource 
demanding strategy, but the fact that automotive fuel tanks present a potential hazard to 
vehicle manufacturers was a critical factor that provided a strong incentive for the vehicle 
manufacturer to engage in direct intervention. The relationship between EuroPart and the fuel 
pump supplier (S2) was also restrained with regard to openness of communication. S2 
submitted that design information relating to its component and underlying technology was 
withheld from EuroPart, because it was not seen as “part of the process” and because of fears 
that EuroPart might use the information to develop its own fuel pump. 
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Intervention was more limited in the other two cases. In the Asian car project AutoEngineer 
brought together two suppliers to jointly engage in knowledge sharing and problem solving 
processes. In the base station project there were similar examples of the focal company, 
TelePart, bringing together suppliers to resolve delivery problems, which TelePart was 
unable to resolve at a dyadic level.  
 
Delegation in communication 
 
Although the cases illustrated extensive direct communication between companies and their 
indirect suppliers through intervention, this did not completely preclude delegation of 
communication. In the Asian car project AutoEngineer delegated communication 
responsibility to its suppliers by actively encouraging these to ensure clarity of project goals 
within their supply network. Furthermore, AutoEngineer encouraged communication between 
two prototype suppliers, facilitating knowledge sharing and joint problem-solving. In the base 
station project there were similar examples of suppliers at the same tier being encouraged by 
their customer to communicate with each other, and joining forces in trying to resolve 
delivery problems, which TelePart was unable to resolve through involving only direct 
suppliers. 
 
Elsewhere, delegation often took the form of „delegation by default‟ with companies 
expecting suppliers to share information with their own suppliers, but apparently without 
issuing any explicit or formal instructions to do so. In such cases, the standard response was 
that „this was left to suppliers‟. Table 3 provides an overview of the findings on supply 
network intervention and delegation in supplier selection and communication during NPD 
across the three cases. 
  21 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
7. Discussions and conclusions 
 
In summary, the three case studies show that companies do attempt to involve not only direct 
suppliers but also key sub-suppliers within the wider supply network. Some companies 
involved indirect suppliers much more extensively than others, however, and there were 
evidently both positive and negative implications of engaging in the wider supply network. 
 
The fuel tank case exhibited the most extensive supply network intervention, predominantly 
by J-Car. This company intervened in the key sub-supplier selection process, and in 
communication of critical design changes and commercial negotiations with key sub-
suppliers; J-Car thus exerted strong power and influence over its entire fuel tank supply 
network, leaving EuroPart as the (supposedly) full systems supplier of the fuel tank in a very 
difficult situation. Consider the other automotive case, the Asian car project: here the vehicle 
assembler relied much more extensively on delegation and employed intervention in a more 
indirect and subtle manner. However, the base station project resembled the fuel tank project 
in several ways, notably the use of intervention in sub-supplier selection. The base station 
case showed how delegation was used in combination with intervention with seemingly good 
results, causing far less friction amongst supply network actors.  
 
 
7.1. Manifestations of supply network intervention and delegation strategies 
The three case studies showed how supply network intervention and delegation strategies 
were manifested in different ways across supply networks in the context of supplier selection 
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and communication processes. This section reflects on the different ways in which the two 
strategies were conducted across the cases. 
 
Delegation 
The delegation strategy represents one possible way to actively involve and influence indirect 
suppliers in a company‟s NPD project, and thereby reach into the capabilities and 
technologies that exist within the wider supply network. In the case studies the delegation 
strategy was manifested in three different ways: 
 
1. Issuing parts approval lists. The practice of issuing parts approval lists to direct suppliers 
constituted an explicit and formalized approach to entrust authority and responsibility to 
direct suppliers. For example, the telecommunications OEM in the base station case (TM) 
issued a parts approval list to its direct suppliers in order to ensure that its standards were 
met throughout the wider supply network; the investment in producing approved parts 
lists was significant as customers were unwilling to deviate from the lists. Such explicit 
use of delegation within the supply network was therefore an important means to involve 
suppliers in the NPD project whilst still maintaining a degree of control.  
2. Encouraging communication and problem solving. The practice of encouraging suppliers 
to share information with their suppliers was another example of an explicit approach to 
delegation. The use of the term „encouragement‟ by many respondents emphasized the 
voluntary nature of this form of delegation; interviews with those suppliers being 
encouraged by their customers suggested that they perceived this approach to delegation 
as motivating (Osterloh and Frey, 2000): as they were „encouraged‟ rather than forced it 
gave them discretion.  
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3. „Leaving it to suppliers‟. This approach could be seen as delegating by default: suppliers 
were expected to manage the involvement of their own suppliers without explicit 
instructions or encouragement. Such an approach gave the customer little control over the 
involvement of indirect suppliers in NPD projects. Instead they trusted that suppliers had 
the competencies to manage their own suppliers, which might work well where suppliers 
are capable to manage independently (Sako, 1992; Ragatz et al., 1997). The risk was that 
a company might work hard to ensure the involvement of its direct suppliers both early 
and closely in the design and development process, but the company might do nothing to 
ensure the active involvement of the rest of its supply network.  
 
Intervention 
The findings showed intervention to be a common strategy, practiced by several actors to 
enable the supplier and sub-supplier selection process and communication. Across the cases 
the intervention strategy was manifested in four different ways: 
 
1. Selecting/specifying sub-suppliers. In the fuel tank case there was extensive specification 
of sub-suppliers by the powerful Japanese vehicle assembler J-Car. This strategy assured 
J-Car that critical fuel tank components were sourced from trusted sources. Intervention 
in sub-supplier specifications during NPD projects seems to fit the high level of supply 
chain engagement of Japanese automakers, and helps to maintain cost transparency as 
also established by Sako (2004) and Cousins (2001). A more moderate version of this 
approach was observed in the Asian car and base station cases where the components 
supplied by sub-suppliers were specified rather than the actual suppliers. This was closely 
related to the use of parts approval lists, as discussed under delegation strategies, but it 
was not so much a list as a very narrow choice based where suppliers were technically 
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free to choose any sub-supplier they wanted provided that component specifications were 
met. As AutoEngineer revealed in the Asian car case, this was done to make it seem less 
dictatorial than specifying the actual supplier although, in reality, the supplier‟s freedom 
was limited.  
2. Negotiating/purchasing from sub-suppliers. The fuel tank and base station cases 
illustrated how manufacturers not only selected indirect suppliers but also negotiated 
directly with these. In the fuel tank case, this method of intervention gave J-Car full 
visibility of the costs and margins of sub-suppliers of high value components, so 
reinforced cost transparency within the supply network (Lamming et al., 2004). Such 
direct purchasing methods (Brown et al., 2005) have received relatively little attention in 
the literature. The case studies in the present study indicated that this provided much cost 
transparency although, as discussed later, not necessarily in the interest of those suppliers 
being circumvented during the negotiation process. 
3. Communicating design changes and commercial information to sub-suppliers. The fuel 
tank case stood out by providing yet another example of intervention: communication of 
design change information directly from J-Car to EuroPart‟s suppliers. This was done to 
ensure that key sub-suppliers were made directly aware of design changes and thereby 
avoiding distortion of information and, ultimately, project delays. Furthermore, 
commercial information, relating to cost and terms & conditions, were communicated 
right across several tiers within this supply network. Although direct exchange of 
information across tiers is a core principle of SCM (Lambert and Cooper, 2000), there is 
little research exploring exchange of design information through the intervention method. 
4. Uniting sub-suppliers for knowledge sharing & problem solving. The Asian car and the 
base station projects both showed how companies had chosen to bring together a group of 
suppliers at the same tier in order to resolve technical problems. They reasoned that none 
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of the suppliers could solve the problems on their own; they would have been unlikely to 
collaborate without the focal companies‟ intervention. In a similar vein to Dyer and 
Nobeoka‟s (2000) analysis of Toyota‟s knowledge-sharing network, these two cases 
showed how manufacturers can facilitate multidirectional knowledge flows among 
suppliers.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates the different manifestations, or examples, of the intervention and 
delegation strategies observed across the cases. Other strategies may exist but were not 
identified in this study. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
7.2. Implications of supply network intervention and delegation strategies for supplier 
selection and communication 
 
The cases pointed to several implications of delegation and intervention. It was evident that 
some of these were predominantly positive, whereas others were negative, depending on 
which supply network actor perspective one adopts. In general, intervention was regarded as 
a positive, or simply necessary, strategy by assemblers or OEMs, whereas suppliers often 
viewed intervention as a negative intrusion in their business. In this section we outline the 
different sides of the two strategies. 
 
Empowering suppliers through delegation 
Organizational behaviour theory suggests that delegation of decisions within organizations 
helps to motivate and empower employees and foster local learning and use of local 
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knowledge (Osterloh and Frey, 2000; Conger and Kanungo, 1988; Foss et al., 2006). Our 
case focused on NPD within customer-supplier relationships and networks and there were 
indications that some positive effects of delegation also applied in an inter-organizational 
context. For example, the Asian car and base station projects exemplified how companies 
encouraged their suppliers to communicate with other suppliers. Both of these projects 
concerned products with a high degree of modularity, so the delegation approach was logical 
(Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Baldwin and Clark, 1997). The implicit approach to delegation 
- „leaving it to suppliers‟ - which was the more common approach in the case studies, 
provided little obvious guidance to suppliers as to how they were supposed to manage their 
own supplier relationships during NPD projects; although it provided a framework for task 
partitioning and autonomous working within supply networks (Von Hippel, 1990) it was 
questionable if this approach was as effective in empowering suppliers as the more explicit 
approach.  
 
Controlling supply networks through intervention and explicit delegation 
Although explicit delegation of decisions concerning supplier selection and communication 
to direct suppliers appeared to have positive implications for empowerment and motivation, 
there were no indications in this study that implicit delegation, „leaving it to suppliers‟,  had 
the same effects. There was certainly a risk that this approach relied on a wishful hope or 
blind trust (Williamson, 1993), that direct suppliers would act on behalf of customers. If 
companies choose to involve suppliers in NPD they arguably need to take appropriate 
measures to control the NPD process within a wider supply network context; explicit 
delegation provides one way to achieve such control but intervention provides another, 
perhaps more reassuring, method to managers. In fact, many respondents explained that 
where components were critical, particularly from a safety perspective, they felt inclined to 
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intervene directly in indirect supplier selection and communication to ensure compliance 
from suppliers (Johnsen and Ford, 2007). Product liability implies that companies can ill 
afford to take chances with the NPD process.  
 
Moreover, companies perceive that they can control cost better by exerting authority through 
intervention within the supply network. Controlling the supply network through such 
methods is entirely consistent with SCM, which assumes that companies possess the power 
to, and may benefit from, delegating and intervening across dyadic supplier relationships 
(Lamming, 1996). The cases exemplified how companies apparently obtained full visibility 
of costs within the supply network by communicating and sometimes negotiating directly 
with indirect suppliers. The potential cost implications from such intervention may therefore 
be significant. From a supplier perspective, however, the cases demonstrated clearly how 
they felt constrained in their own supplier selection and communication, and we may 
question if intervention results in the desired effects from an overall supply network 
perspective. 
 
‘Tying the supplier’s hands’: the flipside of intervention 
The case studies revealed how one company‟s attempts to intervene within the wider supply 
network presented significant problems for those suppliers effectively „caught in the middle‟. 
In the cases in which network intervention strategies were applied extensively, especially the 
fuel tank project, some suppliers had to cope with customer interventions in their own supply 
base. Intervention significantly affected the ability of suppliers to control their own supplier 
selection process and communication.  
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The notion of „tying the manager‟s hands‟ (Root, 1989; Foss et al., 2006) expresses well the 
situation of suppliers having to cope with customer intervention, so in this case we can 
express the same situation as „tying the supplier‟s hands‟. Intervention may give the customer 
(the intervenor) more control over which suppliers are involved in NPD projects, 
communication with these, and cost control. However, the risk is that forceful and 
opportunistic intervention results in sub-optimization (Williamson, 1996) within the supply 
network and is damaging to overall value creation: although it gives the intervenor a sense of 
increased control it potentially harms the customer-supplier relationship dynamics critical to 
successful supplier involvement in NPD. This view has been suggested both in industrial 
network theory (Håkansson, 1987; Ford et al., 2003) and the more mainstream supplier 
involvement in NPD literature (Ragatz et al., 1997; LaBahn and Krapfel, 2000; Song and 
Benedetto, 2007). In particular, several studies (Bstiler, 2006; Cousins and Crone, 2003; 
Ragatz et al., ibid) emphasized the importance of buyer-supplier trust and commitment as 
pre-requisites for successful supplier involvement. Supply network intervention can easily 
ruin an otherwise constructive relationship atmosphere and may thereby impact negatively on 
innovation. 
 
Intervention in component specification rather than supplier specification potentially presents 
a way to avoid the negative consequences of the intervention strategy. Combined with a more 
consultative approach, as applied by for example TM and TelePart in the base station case, a 
moderate approach to intervention could help to prevent friction amongst supply network 
actors.  
 
 
8. Conceptual and managerial implications 
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This paper has proposed two strategies that companies can employ to access indirect 
suppliers: supply network delegation and supply network intervention. These two concepts 
have received some attention in previous research (Lamming, 1996; Johnsen and Ford, 2005, 
2007). This paper has contributed to a better definition and conceptualization of these two 
strategies, by building on the traditional NPD, organizational behaviour and economics 
literatures. Where Johnsen and Ford (2007) focused on situations of delegation and 
intervention deployment, this paper has added further conceptualization and explored both 
manifestations and multi-actor implications of delegation and intervention in supply 
networks.  
 
The findings have shown the different manifestations of the two strategies, when applied as 
part of supplier involvement in NPD. Delegation may be manifested through issuing parts 
lists, encouraging communication and problem solving, and an implicit „leaving it to 
suppliers‟ approach. Intervention may be manifested through specifying sub-suppliers, either 
by nominating suppliers or specifying components, purchasing from and negotiating directly 
with sub-suppliers, communicating design changes and commercial information directly to 
sub-suppliers, and uniting sub-suppliers for knowledge sharing and problem solving.  
 
The findings have also elucidated positive and negative implications of delegation and 
intervention strategies. This seems to be dependent on the actor perspective i.e. from a 
downstream manufacturer perspective there is a perceived need to control the NPD process 
across several supply network tiers through direct intervention in supplier selection and 
communication, but from an upstream perspective these actions are likely to be restricting for 
suppliers and lead to sub-optimization (Williamson, 1996). In comparison with the 
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mainstream supplier involvement literature, which remains largely dyadic (e.g. Wasti and 
Liker, 1997; Petersen et al., 2005), the paper has contributed to a better understanding of how 
to involve not only direct suppliers, but also indirect (sub-) suppliers in NPD. The paper 
proposes that the concept of „tying the manager‟s hands‟ (Foss et al., 2006) may equally 
apply in an inter-organizational supply network context, expressed as „tying the supplier‟s 
hands‟. Below, two managerial implications are briefly outlined. 
 
Reach out to entire supply networks 
The importance of involving not only direct suppliers in NPD projects, but also the wider 
supply network, has been emphasized in this paper. It is insufficient to focus purely on the 
involvement of direct suppliers when the performance of a company‟s direct suppliers 
themselves is heavily dependent on the wider supply network; this is especially true when 
seeking to develop radical innovations. When companies face conditions of technological 
uncertainty (Ragatz et al., 2002; Song and Benedetto, 2007), managers need to involve the 
wider supply network rather than purely look to direct suppliers. Indeed, such conditions may 
require connecting with new suppliers outside existing networks that are not within the 
company‟s usual field of vision (Birkinshaw et al., 2007).  
 
Deploy intervention and/or delegation – with care 
This paper has proposed and conceptualized two strategies that companies can employ to 
seek to involve their wider supply network: supply network delegation and intervention. 
Delegation fits modular products well as they allow a greater extent of task partitioning. 
Managers need to be aware that there are good ways and bad ways to deploy these. The 
delegation strategy should mean more than simply „leaving it to suppliers‟. Even though 
companies would like to trust their core strategic suppliers to make decisions on their behalf, 
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it is necessary to ensure that customer expectations and preferences are transparent. A 
delegation strategy in which companies clearly and explicitly influence supplier selection and 
communication within a small number of strategic suppliers, and trust these to manage their 
own supplier relationships, is more likely to yield the desired outcomes. This could be done, 
for example, by issuing parts approval lists and encouraging communication and problem 
solving amongst suppliers. Managers may benefit from complementing supply network 
delegation with direct intervention in the wider supply network, for example to influence the 
choice of key sub-suppliers. However, managers should take care to do so through 
component rather than supplier specification, and avoid tying their suppliers‟ hands by 
forcing them to work with particular suppliers. 
 
Limitations and future avenues of research 
The paper is based on a limited number of in-depth case studies conducted across two 
industries. None of the three cases stood out as being unique in any way, although each 
individual case featured particular themes. The external validity provided by three cases 
constituted a first step towards replication and thus testing of the findings in different 
situations. However, caution is required in any generalizations to other industries with 
different technological characteristics.  
 
Further research is required in a wider number of research contexts to analyze the outcomes 
of supply network strategies. Johnsen and Ford (2007) focused on such issues, suggesting 
various contextual factors that appear to be important in understanding patterns of delegation 
and intervention, but this study did not set out to test these links. Moreover, the link between 
NPD characterized by different degrees of innovation and the need for supply network 
involvement warrants further research. Future research might also consider how suppliers 
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participate if different stages of the NPD process and the relevance of delegation and 
intervention strategies across these stages. Finally, longitudinal or large scale survey research 
assessing the performance outcomes of supply network delegation and intervention would 
help to elucidate in which contexts the different forms of intervention and delegation 
strategies predict superior NPD performance.  
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Appendix A - Interview Protocol 
 
Most questions were open-ended and the interviewer provided interviewees the opportunity to provide 
illustrative examples.  Nature of questions varied depending on whether respondents represented focal company, 
suppliers or customers. The following represents an abbreviated generic version of the actual instruments used. 
 
Respondent, company and project context: 
 Respondent position and responsibility 
 Size of organization in terms of employees and turnover 
 Major products and core technologies  
 Degree of product modularity/integral architecture 
 Current stage or completion date of NPD project  
 Arrangements for sharing of development costs 
 
Extent of innovation and performance: 
 Product and process technologies developed for new product  
 Extent of innovation in NPD project 
 Target and actual development cost and time 
 Target and actual product cost 
 Patents and awards received 
 Learning experience 
 
Mapping of supply network (this part of interviews involved network mapping): 
 Main suppliers involved in development and their suppliers 
 Main distributors and customers involved in development 
 Any other companies involved, including competitors, complementary manufacturers in other industries, 
research institutions, consultants 
 
Supplier involvement processes: 
 Process of supplier identification and selection  
 Supplier selection criteria and timing of involvement  
 Ability to choose own suppliers e.g. influence of other actors  
 Attempts to manage supplier selection in wider supply network e.g. through delegation and intervention 
 Process and extent of communication e.g. in relation to design ideas, concepts, policies, procedures and 
performance  
 Alignment of technology plans 
 Attempts to communicate and share information in wider supply network e.g. through delegation and 
intervention 
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Figure 1. Simplified Supply Network Maps 
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Figure 2. Manifestations of Supply Network Delegation and Intervention 
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Table 1. Case Study Characteristics 
 Fuel Tank Project 
 
Asian Car Project 
 
Base Station Project 
Interviews 12 interviews: 7 focal firm, 4 
suppliers, 1 customer 
10 interviews: 7 focal firm, 2 
suppliers and 1 customer 
12 interviews: 8 focal firm, 3 
suppliers and 1 customer 
NPD project Automotive fuel tank – safety 
criticality driven 
Car for Asian markets – cost 
and safety driven 
Radio frequency (RF) 
component for base stations – 
cost driven 
Project stage 
at data 
collection 
 
Recent launch/ramp-up Ramp-up Final prototyping 
Focal 
company (FC) 
1st tier automotive parts 
supplier: „EuroPart‟ 
1st tier automotive engineering 
supplier with full Turnkey 
project responsibility: 
„AutoEngineer‟ 
 
1st tier telecoms network 
supplier: „TelePart‟ 
Product 
architecture 
Modular Modular Modular 
Underlying 
technology 
and level of 
innovation 
New application of material 
technology: incremental NPD 
New body-in-white material 
applied first time in high-
volume vehicle production 
enabling a process innovation. 
Patents pending - radical 
innovation 
New RF upgrade: incremental 
NPD 
Performance Target development cost and 
time achieved 
Frustrating project 
 
Unspecified project delay  
Frustrating project 
Project delay 6 months 
Target cost not achieved  
Management problems 
NB: FC denotes Focal Company in each case 
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 Table 2. The Three Case Studies 
Fuel Tank Project: This case concerned the development of a fuel tank module for a Japanese vehicle 
manufacturer. The focal company, „EuroPart‟, operated as a 1st tier supplier to the automotive industry, and 
was a joint venture (JV) between a UK company and a continental European company. The fuel tank project 
applied a newly developed composite material. EuroPart had only one customer in this project („J-Car‟): a 
Japanese vehicle manufacturer. J-Car dual sourced its fuel tanks from EuroPart and a long-term Japanese 
supplier. EuroPart‟s supply network consisted mainly of plastics suppliers, and suppliers of blow- and 
injection mouldings, high-pressure die-casts, and tooling. Two indirect suppliers were critical: S1, sourced 
„child parts‟ (sub-components) into European 1st tier suppliers for J-Car. Secondly, S2 was the UK subsidiary 
for a major Japanese parts supplier (S2 Japan).  
 
Asian Car Project: This case focused on a vehicle development project aiming at high volume sales in East 
Asia. The focal company, AutoEngineer, had full turnkey responsibility for vehicle design, engineering, plant 
construction and sourcing in Asia. The project involved the application of a new composite material offering 
substantial cost and weight advantages. AutoEngineer‟s customer was a JV between a global vehicle 
manufacturer („VM‟) and an Asian manufacturing plant and a government body. The supply network also 
included production suppliers and machinery and equipment suppliers. S1, a global 1
st
 tier supplier, originally 
sub-contracted the design to AutoEngineer later transferring all responsibilities to its Asian branch. S2, a 
design consultancy based in Asia, was a collaboration between VM and S1 that conducted initial styling 
concepts and engineering and ultimately full engineering responsibility. 
 
Base Station Equipment Project: This case focused on the development of a new high frequency radio filter 
component (RFC) for telecommunications base stations. The project involved some new applications but 
mainly of proven technology. „TelePart‟; the focal company in the case, was a first tier base station supplier, 
specializing in commercial wireless communication. TelePart was the single source with its customer, a major 
global telecommunications OEM („TM‟). S1, a medium-sized company specializing in high pressure and 
precision die-casting, supplied component bodies. S2, a small telecoms contract manufacturer, had less design 
involvement in the project. S3 was a small internal supplier providing silver-plating.  
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Table 3. Supply Network Intervention and Delegation Across Three Cases 
 Fuel Tank Project Asian Car  
Project 
Base Station Project 
Supplier 
selection 
 
 
 
  
 
Intervention:  
- FC‟s customer nominated 
key sub-suppliers and 
negotiated directly with FC‟s 
most critical supplier 
- In one relationship 
specification was managed 
through sourcing function 
Intervention:  
FC specified sub-supplier 
parts for safety-critical parts 
in consultation with 
customer  
 
 
Intervention:  
- Specification of sub-
supplier parts jointly with 
FC customer 
- FC consulted its customer 
re. its assessment of sub-
suppliers 
- FC negotiated & purchased 
materials on S4‟s behalf 
Delegation: Mostly 
intervention; only delegation 
where companies simply left 
supplier selection decision to 
suppliers  
Delegation: Companies left 
supplier selection to 
suppliers 
Delegation:  
- FC customer produced 
parts approval list to which 
suppliers must adhere  
- Supplier selection usually 
left to suppliers 
Communication 
  
Intervention:  
FC‟s customer 
communicated design 
changes directly with sub-
suppliers   
 
Intervention:  
FC united two suppliers for 
problem solving 
 
 
 
Intervention:  
FC united two suppliers for 
problem solving 
Delegation:  
Where not intervening 
companies left 
communication to suppliers 
Delegation:  
FC encouraged 
communication amongst two 
suppliers 
Delegation:  
FC encouraged 
communication amongst 
suppliers & involved indirect 
suppliers in problem solving 
Dominant 
strategy 
Strong direct intervention 
from vehicle assembler 
Combined indirect 
intervention & explicit 
delegation 
Combined intervention & 
explicit delegation 
FC: Focal Company 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
